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Scenarios for escaping 
the constitutional impasse
The European Union’s constitutional treaty remains 
central to whatever realistic scenario one might imagine,
argues Philippe de Schoutheete, who was for many
years the doyen of the EU diplomatic corps in Brussels.
He assesses the options now open to policymakers
W
hen confronted with a situation
that is both critical and complex
it is generally advisable to go 
back to basics. Now that precisely such a
situation has arisen in the European Union
with the rejection of the constitution by
French and Dutch referenda, what are the
basics?
A first point – aptly made by Tøger
Seidenfaden in the Spring issue of Europe’s
World – is that referenda do not represent a
“higher form” of democracy. Representative
democracy is not such a bad legitimation
mechanism, the basic values of post-war
western democracies in the period defined,
incorporated and defended by the UN,
NATO and European treaties, none of which
were approved by referenda. If the
European Coal and Steel Community treaty
had been submitted to a referendum in
1950, it would most certainly have failed in
France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Five
years after the war, public opinion was not
ready to accept any treaty implying durable
links with Germany. Its foundation was
nevertheless an act of wisdom worthy of
mature democracies. Countries that
practice referenda are no more democratic
than a country like Belgium where they are
prohibited by the constitution.
Nevertheless, the trend in favour of
referenda on European treaty issues is
strong and will not go away.
A second point is that international
relations are based on the assumption that
governments will ratify and implement the
treaties they have signed. Treaties are to
nations what contracts are to business: if
you don’t respect your signature, your
credibility disappears. Why negotiate a new
text with a government that has shown
itself incapable of implementing the
previous one? This point does not seem
always to be understood, notably in France
where part of the “Non” campaign in the
referendum was based on the false
assumption that a “plan B” would appear
from somewhere, or that a new treaty could
easily be negotiated. An interesting parallel
is to be found in Michel Dumoulin’s
biography of Paul-Henri Spaak. In June
1954, Spaak, as the Belgian Foreign
74 | Europe’s World Summer 2006Minister, was pressing France for speedy
ratification of the European Defence
Community treaty, but French Premier
Pierre Mendès France suggested modifying
the text. Spaak reacted angrily, saying that
“it was not for France to modify a treaty
which she had signed with others”. When
such an incident occurs, time has to elapse
and leaders change before fresh
discussions can take place.
A third point, perhaps easily forgotten,
is that the treaty we are talking about is
neither the result of abstract academic
debate nor a technocratic conspiracy by
unelected civil servants. In all its essential
parts, it is the result of 18 months of debate
in a constitutional Convention that was
almost entirely composed of elected
politicians. They were not “representatives”
in the sense of having been elected for that
precise purpose (as Seidenfaden would like
to see happen in future), but they were
representative in the sense that they were
drawn from a wide variety of political forces
and reflected the diverse views prevalent in
member states, candidate countries and EU
institutions. They spent three months
listening to all sorts of opinions expressed
by civil society, and then with an
unprecedented degree of transparency
debated for more than a year before finally
coming to a large degree of agreement. The
Praesidium, somewhat optimistically, chose
to call it a consensus, and in a moment of
euphoria the text was called a constitution. 
The fact was that both “consensus” and
“constitution” were the result of negotiated
compromises between left and right, big
and small, rich and poor, members new and
T
he constitution is ill, long live the
constitution!” is Philippe de
Schoutheete’s message. I share his
optimism, but several caveats need to be
made.We need a better understanding of the
rapid melt-down of public support for the
constitutional treaty in early 2005, and
referring to the unpopularity of the leaders or
to economic unease does not suffice. For the
first time, tens of millions of people in
founding member states voted against the
European icon. What is more, a culture of
resistance to change has developed within
Europe just as the EU was positioning itself as
a missionary of reform.
I would also be very cautious about
dismissing referenda as a “higher form” of
democracy. The founding fathers were able to
proceed without any wider public debate, but
today’s reality is different. Citizens have an
overwhelming degree of democratic choice,
and it is still on the rise, so the problem lies
more in consistency. When used at random,
referenda produce shockwaves to the system.
People can rightly argue, as they did in France
and the Netherlands, that they had not been
consulted for too long and therefore wished to
register their discontent.
Nor am I entirely convinced by de
Schoutheete’s assertion that “international
relations are based on the assumption that
I share the analysis
but debate the 
prescriptions
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”old, federalists, sovereignists and
eurosceptics, net payers and net receivers,
national institutions and European
institutions. That those compromises are
highly relevant to political life in Europe has
been confirmed by the fact that a majority
of member states, representing a majority
of the population of the Union, has ratified
that treaty. The two referenda have
obscured that historical background and
those facts, but they are, nevertheless,
facts.
What conclusions can 
we draw from these
considerations? First that it
would be madness to launch
a new full-scale negotiation
process of the sort that,
through the Convention, led
to the present constitution.
There is no reason to
suppose that a new
negotiation would arrive at a result
fundamentally different to the one reached
in 2004. Contradictory interests, views,
ideologies, concepts and prejudices
determined the result of that exercise, and
these do not change rapidly. And who can
guarantee that a new treaty, probably quite
similar to the present one, would be easily
ratified? We cannot run the risk of another
major failure.
Similarly, the idea of cherry picking this
or that part of the treaty should be treated
with extreme caution, at least in the short
term. Each element of the treaty is the
result of mutual concessions, linking one
article to one or more others. The idea that
some parts can be implemented in isolation
is, for the most part, naïve, though there
may be some exceptions.
We need time; certainly more time than
the single year allowed for in the European
Council’s decision of June 2005. Time to see
new political leaders come to power. Time
to fully recognise the weaknesses of the
present system of European governance,
which every new presidency makes the
more obvious. Time, hopefully, to benefit
from an upturn in economic
activity and a decrease in
unemployment. Time to take
a few concrete initiatives on
points which concern
European citizens, and bring
these initiatives to successful
outcomes. In short, we need
time to overcome the
atmosphere of collective
angst and depression that is
a partial explanation at least
of the two failed referenda. 
This leads us probably to 2008, perhaps
even later as suggested by a recent
manifesto from the London-based Centre
for European Reform. But what then? A new
generation of political leaders, facing
internal and external challenges to the
prosperity, social structure and influence of
the European Union, will have to debate
how to strengthen the weak system of
European governance they have inherited.
In the first instance they will have to
consider whether it is at all possible, in a
Union with 27 or more members, to adopt
quasi-constitutional texts similar to the
recent treaties (Maastricht, Amsterdam,
Nice, and the constitution itself) and apply
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It would be madness
to launch a new 
full-scale negotiation
process. We cannot
run the risk of
another major failuresignificant across the board reforms of the
institutional structure. They may come to
the conclusion that in such cases referenda
are inevitable in a large number of EU
countries, and that the risk of losing at least
one of them for whatever local reason
means the exercise is counter-productive
and should no longer be attempted. This
opinion is certainly gaining ground at the
moment. Or the next generation of EU
leaders may come to the opposite
conclusion, that although referenda will
always be risky their number and their
scope can be limited and the chances of
winning them increased through this or that
practical arrangement, and that therefore
we should not abandon the concept of
broad and ambitious treaties. 
If the second opinion were to prevail,
the constitutional treaty would become the
object of renewed interest. It is a relatively
well balanced and coherent text and it has
the great advantage of being on the table,
while all other solutions would have to be
negotiated from scratch. To make it more
acceptable to this or that constituency,
declarations and protocols could be added
to it, as was the case when past treaties ran
into difficulties. Its name might also be
changed, because the concept of a
“constitution” has in various countries been
part of the problem. A more ambitious
change would remove Part Three of the
treaty, dealing with policies, from the rest so
as to underline the institutional character of
the text. This last change is more difficult
than many people believe, not only
because of numerous cross references in
the present text, but also because some
policies are considered by some countries
governments will ratify and implement the
treaties they have signed”. It is obvious that
no government wants to go through the
torment of picking up the pieces after a failed
ratification attempt, but the question of
legitimacy is going to be a vital test of the
relevance of the European project in the 21st
century.The vote on the constitution therefore
served as an element of a new European
system of checks and balances, and there will
be more to come.
It is true to say that the Convention was the
most democratic experiment in European
history,and its months of debate generated an
enormous stock of ideas. At the same time,
there were evident failures in the way the
Convention functioned. The work of the
Praesidium was clearly far from transparent.
The other trap to be avoided was that of
glorifying things by calling the document a
“constitution”. This was a mistake because it
created both exaggerated expectations and
excessive fears.
As for prescriptions, I would agree that the
last thing the European Union needs is to
restart negotiations all over again. It is no
surprise that French opponents of the treaty
who preached renegotiation of the
constitution have disappeared from the
political scene. There is no appetite for that
among the public.
I believe an attempt to solve the problem
should be made at a relatively early stage,
perhaps as soon as the new political
landscape shapes up in mid-2007. My
reasoning is threefold. First, even on ice the
constitution will lose any remaining freshness,
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exalted location in the treaties. However,
the exercise is technically feasible and
some discreet preparatory work is already
being done. All these different
arrangements should be the object of a
political agreement between member states
before the convocation of a
new intergovernmental
conference (IGC). The
understanding should be that
no subject other than those
previously agreed upon
would be debated in the IGC.
This is probably the only way
to avoid opening Pandora’s
box and debating anew every
single article of the treaty.
The approach suggested
above is neither easy nor without risks, but
it remains realistic as long as the initial
assumption, namely that the ratification
process can succeed, turns out to be
correct.
If, on the other hand, heads of
government were to conclude that we
should no longer attempt to draft major
new treaties, but instead concentrate on
solving one by one specific weaknesses or
points of inefficiency in the present set up,
then the time would come for the cherry
pickers. And, again, the treaty would be a
primary source because it deals in a
balanced way with many recognised
weaknesses and inefficiencies. One can
imagine a protocol creating the post of
foreign minister at the head of a joint EU
external service; and another one, a little
later perhaps, extending majority voting
and parliamentary co-decision to some new
policies; then a third protocol giving a
degree of competence to national
parliaments in the European decision-
making process, and so on. Some countries
might decide that such treaty amendments,
because of their limited scope, did not
justify holding a referendum. In those
countries where a
referendum would
nevertheless be held, the
debate could presumably be
concentrated on the specific
issue at stake, without
wandering into speculation
on, say, the ills of
globalisation or the threat of
Polish plumbers. Democracy
is better served when public
debate is concentrated on
specific concrete decisions rather than on
legal texts dealing with a great variety of
issues.
And of course cherries can be picked in
groups of different size. Some countries
might want to adopt and be bound
together by the defence provisions the
constitutional treaty offers. Others might
want to move forward in matters of justice
and home affairs, as indeed some have
decided to do in the treaty of Prüm.
Belgium’s Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt
has widely advocated, including in the
pages of this journal, the idea of a political
core based on the eurozone. A number of
possibilities on reinforced co-operation
are offered by treaty provisions, and
beyond that experience shows that
whenever a political will exists, legal
experts will find a way to allow some to
move forward.
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This is probably the
only way to avoid
opening Pandora’s
box and debating
anew every single
article of the treatyAn interesting point is that the
constitutional treaty remains central to
whatever realistic scenario one might
consider. All over Europe, journalists,
experts and politicians (including some
government ministers who should know
better) have pronounced it dead. But past
experience shows that if they are
sufficiently broadly based, balanced and
coherent, such texts do not die. In fact,
they cannot be killed! The Tindemans
report, by former Belgian Premier Leo
Tindemans, is a good example. On the basis
of wide consultation in all Community
countries, it proposed in January 1976 a
number of relatively ambitious institutional
reforms and new policies. It was poorly
treated, and in the course of the year to the
glee of some and the despair of others,
several European Councils, acting with due
politeness, pronounced it dead and buried.
But to read that report today, practically
every single proposal it contains has been
put into application over the years. Not
because some supranational demon is at
work behind the scene, but because it gave
a correct assessment of medium-term
problems and potential solutions. In my
view, this is also the case with the
constitutional treaty. A more brilliant future
may yet be in store for it, but even if its
destiny is to follow in the steps of the
Tindemans report, so be it. In the very long
run, it doesn’t make much difference.
p.deschoutheete@irri-kiib.be
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and the reflection period cannot be extended
forever. Second, a fundamental review of the
EU budget is due to begin in 2008-2009, so
placing two major projects on the drawing
board at once would be a risky exercise and
should be avoided. Third, there are
institutional issues in line with the Nice treaty
to be solved before 2009.There will have to be
a decision about a smaller European
Commission, and the closer we get to that
date, the greater the temptation will be to
dream up makeshift solutions.
Cherry-picking is also an invitation for
trouble. The compromise on the
constitutional treaty was a comprehensive
one and should be preserved as such.
Introducing successive improvements would
almost certainly mean that the cohesion of
the Union is sacrificed and the different
speeds would develop. This would come at a
price. As for Philippe de Schoutheete’s
optimism that “such texts do not die”, it will
nevertheless need a helping hand. The
European Union has to regain its appeal in
the eyes of the citizens, and its old building
blocks, including the single market, will not
be enough in this rapidly globalising world.
Therefore, a lot more has to be reinvented
than just the constitutional treaty.
Pawel Swieboda is Director of the EU
Department in the Polish Foreign Ministry.
pawel.swieboda@msz.gov.pl
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